demonstration will assess the effects of case mix adjusted payments on access for heavy-care patients, quality indicators, costs, and other vari ables that are important to policy decisions. The demonstration operates in four states and uses data from two more (Rensselaer 1991) .
In this article we review the current state of our knowledge about case mix adjusted reimbursement with the aim of providing interim answers to decision makers who may be considering adoption of a case mix ad justed system. It also identifies some of the important questions that de signers and evaluators of the HCFA demonstration should consider.
Background
Whereas most authorities regard the market for privately paying nurs ing-home clients as at least imperfectly competitive, the market for Medicaid clients is widely assumed to be noncompetitive (Scanlon 1980; Nyman 1988a,b,c) . Because until recently most states have used certificate-of-need laws to limit the bed supply to fewer Medicaid patients than could be filled by demand, providers face a sellers' market. This shortage of beds adds its own provider incentives, which in turn interact both with payment system incentives and with local private and Medic aid demand for beds.
Access is most restricted when beds are few, would-be clients are many, and the Medicaid payment system pays a flat rate. Facilities can pick and choose Medicaid clients. As a result, it may be more difficult for heavy-care Medicaid clients to find a bed (Nyman, Levey, and Rohrer 1987; Nyman 1989b) .
Case mix adjusted reimbursement is intended to make facilities indif ferent to patients' care needs when they seek admission. Furthermore, if costs o f optimal care are included in the payment rate, the facility sh o u ld be willing to spend adequately to provide appropriate care for the patients it admits. Finally, if the facility knows that it will be paid adequately for its next admission, it may be more willing to encourage an appropriate discharge on a timely basis. Advocates of case mix ad justed reimbursement expect it to improve several aspects o f nursinghome care, including both access and quality.
However, imposing a case mix adjusted reimbursement system on a supply-constrained market may create its own set of disincentives. For example, Nyman (1990) suggests that simply covering the costs of each patient would be insufficient to ensure heavy-care access under condi tions of excess demand. Because all patients would be equally profit able, it is not clear who would gain access (Nyman 1990 ). Nyman suggests that case mix adjusted reimbursements would be successful only if the rate were set so that heavier-care patients were more profit able than lighter-care patients. However, Nyman continues, setting more profitable rates for heavier-care patients creates an incentive for homes to let patients deteriorate.
Another concern is the validity of the premise that heavy-care pay ment adjustment is needed. Weissert and Cready (1988) found, in a one-city study of 1,100 hospital discharges to nursing homes, that Med icaid eligibility processing was a significantly more prevalent cause of delays in nursing-home admissions than patient heavy-care characteris tics, despite bed supply shortages.
Quality problems also may not be solved by case mix adjustment. Nyman (1990) suggests that raising the Medicaid reimbursement rate under excess demand conditions leads to lower rather than higher qual ity care. An increase in quality that attracts an additional private patient results in the displacement o f a Medicaid patient who could have been admitted with no quality increase at all. Hence, the closer Medicaid re imbursement is to private rates, the greater the opportunity cost of rais ing quality to attract private-pay patients, and the less likely a home will try to raise quality (Nyman 1990) .
Furthermore, unless the case mix adjusted payment system is effective in requiring it, extra payment may not be spent on heavy-care patients admitted. The facility may just keep the extra money as profit, or to subsidize inefficiency or to offer better care to privately paying patients. Rehabilitation may be avoided in order to keep patients sick enough to qualify for higher payment. Finally, if based on services, case mix ad justed reimbursement creates incentives to give unneeded services or to falsely report services as having been delivered.
These problems are not unique to case mix adjusted reimbursement. For example, facility-specific systems pay facilities based upon staffing and other costs, which may encourage inefficiency and cross-subsidies of private patients. Case mix advocates argue that any system will have its problems.
Some case mix adjustment advocates also argue that because it was never intended as a quality-assurance or cost-containment mechanism, therefore it should not be judged against those criteria. At the same time, however, they point out that internal management can be im proved and that case mix adjustment information systems can facilitate better planning. Case mix adjustment also can produce improved equity among providers, paying more money to facilities that admit a clientele that is more costly to care for. Finally, because the law of the land now requires assessment of every nursing-home resident, advocates argue that much of the cost of case mix adjustment is already being borne by the system and should no longer be attributed to case mix adjustment systems.
Hence these questions: (1) Do the advantages of case mix adjusted re imbursement outweigh its disadvantages? (2) Is case mix adjustment likely to result in a net improvement over existing and other alternative approaches?
Before reviewing the evidence on case mix adjustment, the following two sections describe case mix adjusted reimbursement systems and how they are used in several states.
Design Considerations in Case Mix Classification

C lassification M easures
The whole idea o f case mix classification is to categorize patients into subgroups whose costs of care are homogeneous. Subgroups should also be defined by clinical significance so that providers recognize clinical groupings rather than lumping dissimilar patients together only for sim ilarity in costs o f care.
Both indirect and direct measures are used to aggregate patients into groups whose costs o f care are thought to be homogeneous (Grimaldi and Jazwiecki 1987) . Indirect measures include variables such as level of care (e.g., skilled versus intermediate) and facility characteristics such as bed size, ownership, and payer source mix (e.g.. Medicare versus nonMedicare). Direct measures include variables such as functional level, medical condition, and services required. The most commonly used measure of functional status in case mix systems is Katz's Activities of Daily Living (ADL) Index (Katz et al. 1963) , although various disability scales have been used in patient classification, including the Barthel In dex (Mahoney and Barthel 1965) , the Rapid Disability Scale (Linn 1967) , and the Kenny Self Care Evaluation (Shoening et al. 1965 ).
Quantity and type of services or procedures the patient requires are sometimes used to measure patient severity (Arling et al. 1987) . How ever, use of services rather than patient characteristics introduces per verse incentives to increase these services unnecessarily. If staff assessors declare that a patient needs a service, assignment to a higher reimburse ment subgroup becomes automatic. Examples of mistakes include "monitoring of intake/output of fluids," which was included in an early version of the Resource Utilization Group (RUG) system developed by Fries and Cooney (1985) . The variable acted as an indicator of heavycare needs (and higher payment categories), but was easy to manipulate because facilities were able to place patients on fluid monitoring and cause no harm to them (Schneider et al. 1988) . To avoid such "gaming of the system," independent variables should be objectively and reliably measured and easy to collect (Arling et al. 1987; Schneider et al. 1988) .
Reassessment o f status is also a concern. A system that is highly re sponsive in adjusting payment to changing health status may result in poor quality if payment drops as patients recover. Methods to counter this perverse incentive include prolonged or indefinite payment at the higher classification rate despite reclassification o f the rehabilitated pa tient, or segregation of patients who have rehabilitative potential from those who do not (Smits 1984) . "Bracket creep," or fictitiously assigning to patients characteristics that would move them to higher payment groups, might be neutralized by using prevalence rates of heavy-care in dicators to trigger quality audits. However, whether quality audits can work with case-mix-change triggers sensitive enough to stop " bracket creep" has not been tested empirically and would be difficult to enforce if the sheer number o f facilities engaged in this practice hides it from scrutiny because there is no obvious outlier.
M easuring C osts
These direct and indirect measures o f resource use can be thought of as predictors o f variation in costs. System design must also address the is sue of how to define and measure costs. Costs are usually measured per day, but a more global measure would be cost of an episode of care, however defined. All case mix adjusted reimbursement systems now in place use estimated cost per day, rather than any type of predicted epi sode cost. One concern is that this may cause the opportunity to encour age shorter, more effective stays to be lost.
Regardless o f the time period covered, all systems define costs to in clude some combination o f nursing and aide time, which has been found to account for a large portion o f total nursing-home costs. The Resource Utilization Group-Medicare (RUG-T18) scale includes cost of nursing care, rehabilitative therapy, and social services (Fries et al. 1989 )-Cameron (1985 developed a system that incorporated nursing care, supplies, dietary services, drugs, linen, and other ancillary services. Weissert and colleagues (1983) included costs for supplies uniquely asso ciated with certain patient classifications (e.g., formula for tube-fed pa tients), as well as direct patient care costs, and allocated staff costs such as time the nurse spends setting up the medication tray before adminis tering medications.
Measurement of cost, such as nursing and other staff time, can be ap proached in different ways, including direct observation , staff self-report (Arling et al. 1987; Schneider et al. 1988; and Fries et al. 1989) , expert estimates (Cameron 1985) , and cost function studies , in which costs are regressed on case mix measures, facility characteristics, and other predictors to obtain co efficients for case mix variables. Weissert and colleagues (1983) mounted an extensive stop-watch observation of nurses caring for sam pled patients as well as nurses' direct-care and other time to measure how costs varied with patient characteristics and the ratio of direct-care time to allocated time.
M eth o d s o f C lassification
Once costs are reported, they must be used to classify patients. A classi fication or grouping method uses statistical techniques like analysis of variance to form groups o f patients whose individual characteristics make them similar in their resource use (Schneider et al. 1988 ). An index system ) and a clustering system (Schneider et al. 1988; and Fries et al. 1989 ) are the two primary methods of creat ing classifications. An index or rating system assigns a cost estimate to each of the selected direct or indirect measures, which are then summed to form a total rating. Patients with similar ratings are assigned to pay ment subgroups. For clustering systems, a statistical technique some times used with its associated software is AUTOGRP (AUTOmatic GRouPing system) (Mills et al. 1976) . It is an interactive implementa tion of AID (automatic interactions detection) (Morgan and Sonquist 1963) and was used in the formation of Medicare hospital Diagnosis Re lated Groups (DRGs). The full set of data points is repeatedly split into subgroups, which are homogeneous in their resource use. They are based on levels of predictors (patient characteristics) and are performed in order to maximize prediction of resource cost (Schneider et al. 1988) . Splits are continued until the analyst is satisfied that additional splits will not improve prediction enough to warrant formation of additional groups; too many groups produce cells with samples too small to be sta tistically stable. It is also desirable to create a system with a minimal number o f groups (while explaining a large percentage of variance) to reduce confusion and administrative costs (Arling et al. 1987 ).
The classification system should be able to distinguish the relative in tensity of care needed by heavy-care patients (Fries and Cooney 1985) . Distribution o f patients among the categories may be uneven. The sam ple size should be large enough to ensure accuracy of point estimates for group means even in the smallest terminal group (Arling, Zimmerman, and Updike 1989) . In the second version of the RUG system (RUG-II), 54 percent o f the patients were clustered into the two largest terminal groups, and 22 percent were clustered into the smallest ten terminal groups (Schneider et al. 1988 ). In the RUG-T18 (Medicare patients only) system o f classification, three of the terminal groups had no pa tients classified into them (Fries et al. 1989) .
Homogeneity o f the levels of a classification system can be expressed by computing the coefficient of variation (i.e., the standard deviation divided by the mean). It expresses the "tightness" of the values within a level. A coefficient o f variation o f less than 0.5 indicates that the dis tribution is acceptably homogeneous, according to some experts. Table 1 briefly describes case mix classification systems reported in the published literature as well as the third version o f the RUG system (RUG-III) developed for the HCFA case mix demonstration project. Some o f these systems were used in one or several states, others were demonstration projects, and the remainder have been proposed in the literature only. The table shows that the systems appear to be relatively successful in explaining resource consumption, ranging from 38.4 to 68.5 percent o f the variance. Although the studies take a variety of ap proaches to measuring resource consumption (Delphi technique versus self-reports versus observation), all have focused on the intensity of nursing resource use over a standard time interval (Fries and Cooney 1985) . All include, at a minimum, functional dependency and special 
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care needs as predictors. Cameron's system also employs neurological impairment and medical condition. RUG-II, RUG-T18, and RUG-III include medical conditions and behavioral problems, to which RUG-T18 adds therapies and RUG-III adds depression and nursing rehabilitation.
Although their predictors were similar, the researchers did not use them in the same way to split their patients into groups. Cameron is the only one to choose severe neurological impairment as the first split, claiming that patients with severe neurological impairments may be considered clinically distinct from other long-term-care (LTC) patients. Fries and Cooney (1985) chose to discriminate the first seven of the nine RUG groups solely by functional dependency. This approach was later refined by first dividing patients into clinical categories and then subdi viding them by functional status in RUG-II and RUG-T18. Similarly, Arling and colleagues (1987) split patients first by care needs, then by functional status, and later (1989) by a third tier, which was divided de pending on the presence or absence of behavioral problems. Arling, Zimmerman, and Updike (1989) asserted that the most trou blesome dimension of case mix studies has been the treatment of psychobehavioral conditions. Phillips and Hawes (1992) similarly contend that RUG-II and other case mix systems do not recognize the impor tance of cognitive functioning in determining resource needs. In fact, these dimensions are largely ignored by many classifications. Those that do focus on psychobehavioral difficulties include the problems that are disruptive or harmful to self or others. Arling, Zimmerman, and Up dike (1989) surmised that because the classification studies attempted to measure care provided to nursing-home residents, their results were in fluenced by current practices in the nursing-home industry. Some ar gue, however, that many nursing homes give insufficient attention to psychosocial needs and assign higher priority to behavior control, with chemical and/or physical restraints, than to therapeutic interventions. More passive psychobehavioral problems, such as depression or emo tional withdrawal and cognitive disorders, are not considered indicative of greater resource use. However, Phillips and Hawes's (1992) study of Texas case mix data found that patients with the greatest cognitive problems received the most care, although it was mostly aide rather than nursing care. They concluded that because resource use was not well predicted for cognitively impaired people, nursing homes would not receive adequate reimbursement under RUG-II and would be reluc tant to admit them.
In their new version o f resource utilization groups, RUG-III, Fries and colleagues evaluate cognitive dysfunctions affecting short-term memory, decision making, and orientation. The new groupings form one of the new main splits on cognitive impairment and behavior prob lems and a third-tier split on depression. Among the highest-cost cate gories (i.e., rehabilitation and special care), however, care needs are said to be sufficiently well explained by physical impairments, so that addi tional subgroups based upon mental impairments are not needed.
Despite design differences, an important reality documented by Fries (1990) is that the various systems tend to be similar in their relative re source use classifications because most of the variance is explained by the measures of ADLs included in all systems. Some argue that this al lows system designers considerable flexibility. Others say that, when choosing among systems, it gives more weight to the subtle differences in subgroups afte r functional dependency splits. Still others claim that such similarity makes the amount of effort that has gone into case mix classification seem like overkill.
The San Diego Nursing Home Incentive Reimbursement Experiment funded by the National Center for Health Services Research (now the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research) ) was unique in several respects. A controlled experimental design was imple mented in 1980-83 in 36 proprietary nursing homes in San Diego county to assess effects of paying treatment group homes case mix ad justments based upon 14 categories of ADL and special care needs. Fa cilities were also paid bonuses if they achieved one or more of eight specific outcome goals, and a bonus for a discharge that lasted 90 days. Payment rates reflected wage-adjusted costs of nursing and aide time plus ancillaries such as tube-feeding formula.
One of the objectives of the HCFA demonstration using RUG-III is to develop quality outcomes to link with the payment systems. All four states participating in the demonstration (Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, and South Dakota) will implement a common core quality assurance system consisting o f norms for acceptable treatment of resident out comes. The details have yet to be worked out, and states may add addi tional mechanisms. Payment systems are also expected to vary from state to state and possibly will be adjusted to reflect variation in market con ditions. Because the evaluation design has not yet been drafted, the na ture o f comparison states and systems, if any are to be used, has not been specified.
Another HCFA initiative, the national Minimum Data Set (MDS), while not a case mix classification system, is nonetheless of special rele vance because it provides an important building block for case mix clas sification and payment adjustment. Mandated by Congress in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act o f 1987, and recommended by the Insti tute of Medicine (1986) , it is a tool that must be used to assess all nurs ing-home patients upon admission, annually and at the time of "significant change" in the resident's status (Morris et al. 1990 ). Such a tool would greatly reduce the administrative costs o f implementing a case mix adjusted system. By design, the tool includes many or all of the items used by the leading case mix adjustment systems. One of its draw backs is its reliance on nursing-home staff to collect the material; such staff tends to experience high turnover and to vary in reliability. An other drawback is that, to date, the HCFA has not chosen either to re quire the data to be converted from its hard copy form or to insist on its availability for research and evaluative purposes except at the discretion o f the data-gathering facility. Nonetheless, the potential of the MDS to facilitate implementation of case mix adjustment is profound. Tables 2 and 3 compare the case mix adjusted reimbursement systems of 11 states (Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Vir ginia). Comparisons are made on a number of aspects, including patient classification, data collection, quality assurance, and the reimbursement basis for nursing and nonnursing care and administrative and routine costs. Material for Massachusetts, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia is based upon telephone interviews and follow-up corre spondence with knowledgeable state representatives. Material for Illi nois, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia was drawn largely from the report by P. A. Butler and R. E. Schlenker, A d m inistering N ursing Home Case M ix System s (1988) , which was based primarily on site visits and qualitative information. Although a number o f other states (Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Vermont, and Washington) were in the process o f developing or considering a case mix reimbursement system a t the tim e o f our data collection activities, the details o f their
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11 S e 8 Oh rt S o l Oh U J5 os n, "3 bo-- .i2 3 u co os u z 3S systems were too sketchy to merit description. Similarly, the four states participating in the HCFA demonstration are not discussed because the details of their case mix systems have not been worked out yet. The tables suggest some general observations:
• ADLs and medical conditions and/or the need for specific services are used as the predictors for classification in most of the systems (Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia).
• The dependent variable, resource use, is often determined by mul tiplying nursing times by wages. In some states, such as Illinois and Maryland, wages are adjusted by substate geographic region.
• The number of patient groupings ranges among the states' systems from 4 (Virginia) to 16 (New York, North Dakota, and Pennsyl vania).
• Resident assessments, which can be financially prohibitive, are con ducted in eight of the states (Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) pri marily by the facilities. • In those states in which facilities conduct assessments, the state or a contractor performs audits of facility assessments to ensure the in tegrity o f the data.
Five o f the 11 states (Illinois, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia) employ a "facility-based" case mix adjusted reimbursement system. In such a system, the case mix indices o f the assessed residents are averaged to arrive at one case mix index for the facility. Each resi dent brings the same case mix adjusted level o f payment to the facility. This contrasts with the "resident-level" case mix adjusted reimburse ment system used by the other six states. In a resident-level system, as sessment o f each resident is used to determine the payment that the facility receives for providing services to that resident, up to a ceiling.
"Facility-based" case mix adjusted reimbursement is administratively easier to implement because it is tied to an initial assessment of all resi dents (and periodic reassessments) rather than ongoing individual resi dent assessments. However facility-based case mix systems may create disincentives to admit patients requiring resources above what is reim bursed according to the facility's case mix index. Yet, Willemain (1980) has argued that facility-based classification is superior because assess ment errors resulting from unreliable measurement and intervening pas sage o f time offset each other from patient to patient and assure accuracy on average.
Nonnursing care costs, administrative costs, and routine costs are most often paid to nursing-home facilities irrespective of case mix ad justed reimbursement, although some states pay for case mix adjusted nonnursing costs such as activities, social services, and therapies.
E valuation o f Specific System s
Studies o f the effects and costs o f case mix adjusted reimbursement have been scant and vary widely in their rigor. Those published to date, cov ering the systems in Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia, are summarized in table 4. Unevenness in extent and detail o f findings is unavoidable given the variation in completeness of evaluative studies available on the various states' systems.
Some salient points from the studies include: Illinois. Holahan (1984) reported that average patient impairment scores in Illinois increased by 7.5 percent between 1978 and 1980, sug gesting that heavy-care access increased with the case mix reimburse ment system. In addition, Butler and Schlenker (1988) reported that six months after the introduction of payment for decubitus prevention, the incidence of decubitus fell 38 percent following several years o f stability. Unfortunately, the researchers did not state the number of cases either before or after the incidence drop. One may surmise that the number was small. Butler and Schlenker (1988) also reported that state agency officials observed that financial incentives seemed to gradually encour age facilities to provide more restorative care to patients. O f course, state agency officials had a vested interest in the success of the case mix system. However, other evidence in support of their claim, or contrary to it, is lacking.
Maryland. Feder and Scanlon (1989) found evidence of increased case mix complexity after the Maryland system-a modified version of the San Diego system-was installed. An ADL index increased 6 percent between July 1982, before the system was implemented, and July 1984. A special service index increased 10 percent between January 1983 and July 1984. However, the data may have been influenced by the fact that they came from the same patient records that payment levels were based on during the time the new system was in effect. Because records did not affect payment during the baseline, increased reporting may or may not have merely reflected incentives for more record keeping rather than •c *> oi < L ) actual case mix changes. (Because Maryland had a state hospital rate payment system in place prior to implementation of Medicare's prospec tive payment system for hospitals, results were probably not confounded by the hospital payment system.) Researchers found that the more Medicaid patients a home served, the more it altered its case mix in response to the new system. The ma jority (80.7 percent) of homes with more than 80 percent o f Medicaid patients increased their case mix, compared with about half the homes that had fewer Medicaid patients (Feder and Scanlon 1989) . This find ing, however, may be an effect of small sample size and the data-driven choice of the 80 percent cut-point.
A number of providers perceived that access to nursing homes de clined for light-care patients and that community care was not necessar ily provided in its place. Yet, lack of data precluded researchers from empirically testing this claim (Feder and Scanlon 1989) . This anecdotal evidence suggests that heavy-care access increased, perhaps to the detri ment of some light-care access.
Hospital discharge planners responding to a telephone survey re ported that the new system made it easier to place heavy-care patients. State officials claimed, but did not substantiate, reduced hospital dis charge delays worth $2.5 million in savings in the first year of imple mentation (Butler and Schlenker 1988) . These savings would not be calculated in the same way during the post-DRG period, however, even if validated.
Consequences for quality were mixed. Feder and Scanlon (1989) found no evidence that extra payments were used for additional staff. Yet, Schlenker and colleagues (1988) found that higher payments for turning and positioning and nonpayment for preventable decubitus ul cers were associated with a lower ulcer prevalence in Maryland, at least compared with the other case mix states in their study (Ohio and West Virginia).
Maryland was successful in initiating patient assessment at relatively low cost. The low cost reflected integration with preexisting administra tive practices and investment in education and training by both the state and the nursing-home industry. Professional review organizations (PROs) were contracted to do assessments, incorporating them into on going patient review activities (Feder and Scanlon 1989) . Implementa tion was further facilitated by recendy enacted licensing requirements for uniform patient records. M innesota. Few studies address Minnesota's case mix system. Butler and Schlenker (1988) report that light-care patients sometimes faced difficulty getting admitted to nursing homes. To encourage heavy-care access and discourage light-care access, Minnesota's rates for the lightestcare category pay for fewer nursing hours than the minimum required under licensing standards. On quality, Butler and Schlenker (1988) re port that the bonus for increased resident functioning apparently has not encouraged more restorative care.
The costs o f implementing the system were high. The Department of Health increased its budget from one to two million dollars over a oneyear period to accommodate new assessment and audit functions, despite long experience with assessing its nursing-home population (Butler and Schlenker 1988) .
New York. A document issued by New York State's Department of Health reported that, in the first six months, overall nursing-home case mix increased 11 percent because of admissions of residents with greater care needs. In addition, light-care admissions reportedly decreased (But ler and Schlenker 1988) .
With regard to quality, the Department of Health reported that the per facility average number o f licensing and certification deficiencies de clined from 1985 to 1986, perhaps because the RUG system required documentation to be more detailed than it had been (Butler and Schlenker 1988 ). Because they came from the state's Department of Health, reports o f the results of New York State's case mix initiative may be biased.
On the negative side, New York nursing homes did not increase staff commensurate with their increase in case mix. In addition, researchers found no evidence that the bonus for increased resident functioning en couraged more restorative care (Butler and Schlenker 1988 ).
An objective o f New York's implementation of a case mix adjusted reimbursement system was that it be budget neutral. To limit the im pact of case mix reimbursement on the state's Medicaid budget, the fa cilities conducted patient assessments and paid the cost of training nurse assessors. PROs were contracted to conduct audits. Butler and Schlenker (1988) reported that the case mix system led to the equalization o f payments across New York state nursing homes com mensurate with resident needs and services.
More recently, Thorpe, Gertler, and Goldman (1991) found that New York's RUG-II system produced a significant redistribution of pa tients across RUG-II categories from 1985 to 1986. The number of light-care patients decreased, and the number of heavy-care patients in creased. Change was greatest in skilled facilities where lightest-care pa tients dropped by nearly half, and overall case mix increased by 8.5 percent in facilities near the reimbursement ceiling, and 6 percent in fa cilities not so near the ceiling. Health-related facilities' case mix com plexity also increased, although less dramatically, by about 3 percent. Changes did not differ by ownership, size, or proportion of patients subsidized by Medicaid. Costs grew by 10.2 percent, varying by several facility characteristics. Costs of facilities with more Medicaid patients grew less than average, whereas costs of facilities that were well below the ceilings grew more than average. Outcome effects were not ad dressed, leading the authors to conclude that the relative superiority of case mix adjustment versus facility-specific payment remains an open question for further research.
Ohio. Officials estimated that administering case mix reimburse ment tripled the administrative costs from Ohio's former nursing-home rate system (Butler and Schlenker 1988) . Whereas Ohio had planned to increase expenditures, officials wanted to ensure that such increases were channeled into patient care. Yet the success of the program seems to be mixed. Researchers report that secondary sources support the general impression that access for heavy-care patients in Ohio improved with the implementation of a case mix system. However, Butler and Schlenker (1988) found that payment incentives designed to encourage therapy did not appear to lead to greater provision of services.
W est Virginia. The system does not appear to have improved heavy-care access. Butler and Schlenker (1988) reported that state agency staff asserted that residents needing skilled nursing continued to face access barriers. Holahan (1984) corroborated this assertion in his study that found impairment scores among nursing-home residents un changed between 1978 and 1980. Findings in terms of quality were mixed. On the negative side, Schlenker et al. (1988) reported a connection between the additional payment for catheterization and its higher frequency in West Virginia, relative to the other case mix states (Maryland and Ohio). False charting and overreporting were found as well.
More positively, researchers found that an increase in nursing re sources accompanied increases in patient needs between 1979 and 1981: a 1 percent increase in patient impairment scores resulted in a 1.1 per cent increase in nursing costs (Holahan 1984; Holahan and Cohen 1987) .
The San D iego Experim ent. Results were evaluated by Meiners et al. (1985) , Thorburn and Meiners (1986) , and Jones and Meiners (1986) , and later reassessed by Norton (1990) . Meiners and colleagues found limited positive effects on access only for certain types of heavy-care pa tients and no effects on quality. There was a substantially positive im pact on discharge in only two nursing homes of the 18 in the treatment group. Norton (1990) subsequently used a more sophisticated Markov approach to reanalyze the data and found that length of stay was short ened considerably and mortality was greatly reduced when the effects of all three types o f incentive bonus payments (admission, outcome, dis charge) were treated as one variable.
Disturbingly, however, Meiners and colleagues found no evidence that extra payments received by the treatment group were spent on extra staff. Table 5 shows, in summary, based upon findings from the statewide systems evaluated (the San Diego Experiment is excluded), that, whereas case mix probably improves access for heavy-care patients, it usually has produced little or no net positive effects on quality, and tends to raise costs, sometimes substantially. Although the HCFA demonstration project is timely and likely to be important in improving the state of the art o f case mix adjustment, re search design problems and the small, predominandy rural states and nonrandom choice of facilities within the states for system design data may limit both conclusiveness and generalizability of results.
Cost increases can be measured in pre-to postcomparisons, but out come differences will be difficult to judge without a controlled experi ment, and marginal benefits will be difficult to compute even with very careful selection of comparison states.
A potentially insurmountable challenge will be to disentangle case mix reimbursement effects from simple spending increases and the elab orate quality assurance system being implemented as part of the same demonstration.
Conclusion
Where does all this leave the state policy maker who is trying to choose among various nursing-home reform options including case mix ad justed reimbursement? Probably perplexed. Results of studies done be fore the HCFA demonstration point to access improvement for heavy-care patients, little quality improvement, and higher costs. Local supply and differences between Medicaid and private payment rates may be critical factors in determining whether case mix adjustment achieves its goals, but how these factors are precisely related is un known. Alternative sources of access problems are likely to remain. Nor has its cost-effectiveness been compared with other access solutions. Case mix system design flaws threaten adverse consequences and per verse incentives. Quality assurance mechanisms may require strengthen ing to prevent new case mix related abuses.
Yet system advocates point out that every alternative reform will pro duce its own problems, and they argue that judged against what some view as its principal purpose -access improvement -case mix adjust ment is an unequivocal success, proffering also the added benefit of better planning and management information that implementation of the MDS system has made less expensive. Equity among providers is enhanced.
How much the HCFA demonstration will advance the state of the art remains unknown. State-by-state evaluations of the newer case mix sys tems could add additional insights. One conclusion, however, is clear: those who choose case mix adjustment should carefully decide which goals it is intended to achieve as it is unlikely to achieve much more than better access. Quality is not likely to improve while costs are likely to rise.
